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Discursive cognition of the sort that accompanies the grasp of a natural language involves 
an ability to self-govern by framing and following rules concerning what reason 
prescribes.  In this essay I argue that the formal features of a planning semantics for the 
deontic and intentional modalities suggest a picture on which shared intentional mental 
states are a more primitive kind of cognition than that which accompanies the ability to 
frame and follow a rule, so that deontic cognition and the autonomous rationality 
attending the ability to speak a natural languagemight be understood as an evolutionary 
development out of the capacity to share intentions.  I  the course of defending this 
picture, I argue that it is supported by work in social psychology, evolutionary 
anthropology, and primatology concerning the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development 
of norm psychology and shared intentionality in human beings. 
I will give them an undivided heart and put a new spirit in them. 
Ezekiel 11:19 (New International Version) 
 
I. Introduction  
There is a long tradition in American philosophy that understands itself to be spelling out a 
broadly Kantian notion of rationality as autonomous or self-governed obedience to rules, but 
which is also compatible with a scientific understanding of how we came to be capable of 
rule-governed rational thought and action (see Stovall 2016, 2019, and 2020 for details). In 
the twentieth century this tradition grafted into itself the logico-linguistic tools of what came 
development of these toolsthe work of C.S. Peirce on the logic of relations (a first-order 
logic developed independently of Frege), or of Josiah Royce and C.I. Lewis on modal logic, 
were important developments for the toolkit of analytic philosophy.2  If one figure from the 
second half of the last century were to be singled out as the torch-bearer for this school of 
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Inferentialism and Collective 
Intentionality, GF17-33808L.  
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contributions to computer programming and mathematical logic are more widely appreciated, however.  
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thought it would have to be Wilfrid Sellars.  Sellars, and many of those philosophers 
intellectually descended from him, have endeavored to tell a story about the place of persons 
in nature that at once recognizes the role of normativity in our thought about rationality, and 
which is consonant with current work being done in areas like evolutionary anthropology, 
primatology, sociology, psychology, and neuroscience.  In the interest of telling this story 
they have drawn together and developed a number of explanatory tools and framewo ks for 
as Sellars famously closes his philosophical anthropology for propositional attitude 
ascriptions at the end of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (this characterization is 
meant to include both the so-
like Patricia and Paul Churchland, Daniel 
Dennett, Ruth Millikan, and Jay Rosenberg, though the usefulness of this classificatory 
scheme is questionablesee the penultimate paragraph of Pinkard 2007, p.51). 
Over the course of the development of this tradition in 20th century philosophy, the 
following methodological principle was adopted:  frame an understanding of language use as 
a way of understanding the exercises of rationality that language use gives expression to.  In 
his early work Sellars adopts a version of this principle, calling it psychological nominalism.  
According to psychological nominalism (emphasis in the original) al  awareness of sorts, 
resemblances, facts, etc., in short, all awareness of abstract entitiesindeed, all awareness 
even of particulars is a linguistic affair. 1956, §29).  Psychological nominalism ight 
appear to preclude attributing awareness of particulars to non-linguistic animals, and so 
potentially to preclude providing a foundation for thinking about how we got from the cave to 
the drawing room, the laboratory, and the study.  In §31, however, Sellars says (emphasis 
added) 
logical space prior to, 
 opens up the possibility that non-
linguistic animals might have an awareness of the worldone that justifies attributing 
propositional attitudes to thembut which is not mediated by the use of logical concepts.  
And in his later work Sellars explicitly advocates using the categoris of language use as a 
model for constructing a theory of non-li guistic cognition of the sort that could have evolved 
in not just humans but other animals.  Consider the follow Mental 
Events  (emphasis in the original):  
 
unique modes of relationships between mental events and reality, but rather to provide a 
technique for classifying mental events by references to paradigms in our background 
language. 
 
57.  Such representational systems (RS) or cognitive map-makers [as are possessed by 
some organisms], can be brought about by natural selection and transmitted genetically, as 
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in the case of bees.  Undoubtedly a primitive RS is also an innate endowment of human 
beings.  The concept of innate abilities to be aware of something as something, and hence 
of pre-linguistic awareness, is perfectly intelligible. 
 
In §§37-75 of that essay Sellars argues that the mental events of non-linguistic animals may 
be propositionally contentful and even employ subject/predicate relationson account of 
the fact that they represent the world in ways that are related to ther representations so as to 
.  He then goes on (§§85-101) to distinguish Aristotelian from Humean 
representational systems on the principle that only for the Aristotelian system is the content 
of what is represented processed in terms of logical operations, and he rgues that it is the use 
of logic that distinguishes the properly rational system from one that merely apes reason 
(§§99 and 100; cf. §82).  Despite the apparently austere formulation of psychological 
nominalism given in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, then, there is room for Sellars 
to attribute a wide array of propositionally-contentful mental states to organisms who have 
not moved beyond the grunts and groans of the cave.  
Questions of Sellars exegesis aside, n this essay gical 
we build up a model for 
understanding the thought that P in terms of amodel we construct for understanding the 
assertion that P.  Assertion as a particular kind of speech act will in turn be understood in 
deontic terms, as the kind of thing interlocutors evaluate along normative dimensions. 
Mastery of the rules that govern a language requires not only being able to talk about the 
world and ourselves in various ways, but also to talk about the language itself, and in 
particular to talk in terms of grammatical categories like verb, noun, modality, logical 
expression, and inference.  While the mark of discursive cognition will be a thoroughgoing 
grasp of a natural language strong enough to contain a metalanguage of this sort, I will allow 
that we can attribute propositionally-contentful non-discursive cognitive and practical mental 
states to non-linguistic animals and pre- and proto-linguistic hominids.  Doing so is an 
important part of the story about how we got here from there, but it requires car fully 
distinguishing the categories derived from a theory of linguistic cognition from their 
application to their non-linguistic analogues.  I will argue, by exposition, that we can do so 
profitably.  In using psychological nominalism to develop a model of discursive cognition, 
while being mindful of the need to understand how this sort of activity develops out of its 
pre- and proto-linguistic analogues, we must look for the rulish and natural background 
enabling creatures such as ourselves to use assertions (and other speech acts) in the various 
ways that afford us our distinctively rational cognitive and practical grasp of the world.   
Robert t theory of linguistic meaning, as a particularly well-
developed effort hat is firmly situated within the tradition outlined above, is a useful testbed 
for seeing whether we really can tell a story about the natural and normative grounds of 
rational cognition.  For Brandom, grasp of the meanings of the sentences of a natural 
language, and so the capacity to use language in the exercise of rational thought and agency, 
is in part ous sentences at different 
obedience to the rules 
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that govern the use of those sentences in inference (this need not be an all-or-nothing affair, 
of course).  Rational activity of the sort exemplified in the use of natural language, then, is 
 reason in that language byobeying the norms that govern it.  
This draws to salience the question:  where are the norms?  That question is particularly 
pressing for the naturalist, who will find no list of norms in his descriptive catalog of the 
universe.  
To avoid mysterianism about the norms governing linguistic activity, Brandom 
grounds normative statuses in normative attitudes:  being right or wrong in whatever one says 
is explained (in part) by your community taking you to be right or wrong.3  Normative 
attitudes are instituted via training regimens involving positive and negative reinforcement 
schedules, or what we might call flocktending and stickbeating (Brandom 1994 uses the 
language of stickbeating).  It follows that being right or wrong in whatever one says, and so 
being capable of thinking whatever thoughts one can, is a social achievement for it is only 
in virtue of  community having shaped  linguistic dispositions that one can speak 
the language at all.  And in Making it Explicit Brandom seems to ground normative practices 
in dispositions to sanction, e.g. when talking about a procedure for permitting people to enter 
a theater (1994, pp.161-2):   
Practices of this sort can be described in purely responsive terms for prelinguistic 
communities.  The entitlement given and recognized in these practices has a content for 
an attributor insofar as that attributor practically partitions the space of possible 
performances into those that have been authorized and those that have not, by being 
disposed to respond differently in the two cases.  These sanctioning responses (f r 
instance admitting versus ejecting) and the performances they discriminate (entering of 
the theater) can be characterized apart from and antecedent to specification of the practice 
e sanctions applied 
in taking or treating someone as entitled can be specified in nonnormative terms. 
But if normative statuses are grounded (in part) in normative attitudes, and normative 
attitudes are in some sense a function of positive and negative reinforc ment scheduling, we 
now face a new question:  how should we think about these activities of flocktending and 
stickbeating?  What is it they do, and how do they do it? Relatedly, what is the natural-
scientific basis for the social and physiological onditions that permit communities of human 
beings to engage in these kinds of activities?  Brandom takes tickbeating for granted, 
confident some story can be told, but how should we think of thes  positive and negative 
reinforcement regimens, and how do they leverage us from mere disposition to self-conscious 
rule-governed activity?   
We are at a point at which philosophical reflection and speculation must be 
constrained by empirical inquiry into what we are as evolved and social organisms.  As it 
happens, philosophers are paying more and more attention to work in the sciences that bears 
                                                          
3 also includes a role for the world as an objective feature of the 
language games we play.  See chapter 8 of (1994)though Brandom notes (p.138) that tools used there are 
drawn together in the first seven chapters. 
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on our understanding of human rationality (e.g. in 
2019, Moltchanova Forthcoming, Peregrin Forthcoming, Satne Forthcoming, and Skyrms 
2004).  At the same time some work in social psychology, primatology, and evolutionary 
anthropology is beginning to draw on Sellarsian notions of rationality (e.g. Lohse et al. 2014, 
Schmidt and Rakoczy 2018, and Tomasello 2014).  Philosophy has a role to play in dialogue 
with those conducting empirical research into the ground of human cognition, and there may 
remain things the philosopher is perhaps best suited to discover here.  Adopting a theory of 
shared intentionality that I have developed in other work (Forthcoming A and B), in the rest 
of this essay I will argue that our capacity to adopt normative attitudes regarding language 
use is a function of our capacity to put ourselves into shared intentional planning states 
concerning what we would and would not say and do, where this planning capacity is rooted 
in our evolved and habituated neurological dispositions.  In doing so I hope to extend these 
pre-existing investigations into the basis of rationality in the natural world, to illustrate some 
convergence between the philosophical line of thought I develop and recent research into the 
ontogeny and phylogeny of shared intentionality and norm psychology in human and non-
human primates, and to indicate directions for new work. 
Finally, a note on terminology.  Though this distinction does not figure centrally here, 
in this essay I follow Tomasello (e.g. 2014) and use the term shared intentionality as the 
genus which includes joint intentionality and collective intentionality as two species:  the 
former hypothesized as possessed by early hominids at a stage that allowed them to share 
intentions in dyads and small groups, and the latter hypothesized as a subsequent 
development allowing modern humans to share intentions across an in-pri ciple unlimited 
community, and thereby to frame conceptions of the true and the moral as that which applies 
to everyone.  For an argument that the view I am defending adds an additional level of detail 
by hypothesizing a stage subsequent to that which 
involved collective intentionality, and where human beings were able to plan single-mind dly 
in the sense I discuss below, see my (Forthcoming B). 
 
II.  Modelling the Contents of Exercises of Practical Rationality 
do as opposed, for instance, to how some organism or artifact ought or m
discussion of ought-to- -to- (Forthcoming A) I provide a 
semantic framework sufficient to model the contents of descriptive, deontic, and intentional 
sentences, where the contents of the first are possible worlds having a mind-to-world 
direction of fit and the contents of the others are plans of action having a world-to-mind 
direction of fit.  This theory develops out of ideas first defended by Sellars (e.g. 1951, 1963, 
1966a, 1966b, 1967, chapter 7 of 1968, 1976, and 1980) and given more precise formulation 
by Allan Gibbard (2003).  Central to the account of deontic cognition is a distinction between 
two attitudes under which one can make a choice:  either single-mindedly or indifferently.  
Surprisingly, this distinction appears to have been independently advanced three times over 
the last half-century:  first by Sellars (1966b, 1976), then by Gibbard (2003), and finally by 
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Jamie Dreier (2006, 2009).  Each figure introduces it without reference to prior discussions, 
and no one has examined it in any detail.     
 Beginning with the notion of single-mindedness as basic, the notion of indifference 
can be understood in terms of it.4  As a gloss on single-mindedness we can say that an agent 
chooses single-mindedly just in case she rejects every action incompatible with that choice 
(the notion of rejection here is a term of art).5  An agent chooses indifferently, then, just in 
case she is capable of choosing single-mindedly and there are at least two options open to 
her, incompatible with each other, but each of which are compatible with all of her single-
minded choices (the requirement that she be able to choose single-mindedly is to ensure that 
animals not capable of single-minded thought do not trivially count as choosing indifferently 
in this sense).  That is, a single-minded thinker chooses indifferently between a number of 
incompatible options where she could pick any one without changing her mind on any of her 
single-minded decisions.  In this case she has rejected rejecting each of these options.  Notice 
that the single-minded and the indiffernt frames of mind each involve adopting an affective 
stance both on what one chooses and on a certain class of choices incompatible with what 
one chooses.  In part V I will argue that this indicates that the deontic frame of mind is a form 
of practical cognition that is more conceptually sophisticated than the merely intentional. 
Such states of mind are commonplace, and they can be used to model deontic 
judgments.  Thus, when I think I ought to dress professionally I have rejected every clothing 
option incompatible with doing so by planning on single-mindedly choosing to dress in a suit 
(supposing this is the only option for professional dress).  And when I think I am permitted to 
dress in either of two suits I have rejected rejecting each suit by planning to pick indifferently 
between them.  In cases where I choose indifferently between two permitted options, there 
may of course be other reasons pulling me to choose one over the otherthe point is that the 
choice between them is indifferent in the stipulated sense that both choices satisfy the single-
minded choice to dress professionally.  A judgment that everyone in my department ought to 
dress professionally is then understood as a plan about how I would dress were I any member 
of my department.  In this way moral judgment is understood as the universalization, across 
time, space, and person, of the planning capacities that lie at the back of practical rationality.  
To arrive at this fully generalized notion, we extend the idea of a plan to a hyperplan as a 
maximally determinate plan of action specifying what one would do at any point of choice, 
including what one would do if one were other people.  Just as belief states can be modelled 
with sets of maximally-determinate possible worlds (e.g., the 
plans.  Adopting the method of psychological nominalism, the contents of these mental states 
will be understood in terms of an analysis of the contents of the sentences whose utterances 
give voice to them. 
                                                          
4 This definition is my own, and Sellars, Gibbard, and Dreier each speak of preference rather than single-
mindendess.  B nces, and the relevant contrast (I 





More precisely, let a deontic hyperplan hD be defined as a maximally consistent plan 
of action such that, for every circumstance C, C, and 
every action A C, either (exclusively):  
 
1) -mindedly chooses to A in C on hD; or 
2) -mindedly chooses not to A in C on hD; or 
3) A in C on hD; or 
4) o A in C on hD. 
 
Let  .  
sentence having a mind-to-
true. The world-to-mind semantic values of the three kinds of deontic sentences, and so the 
contents of the mental states their utterances give expression to, are defined in terms of sets 
of deontic hyperplans as follows:6 
 
doing A is obliged in C  universally rejecting not doing A in C 
[[doing A is obliged in C]] =def.. {hD:  for every , -mindedly chooses to A in C 
on hD}  
 
doing A is forbidden in C presses universally rejecting doing A in C 
[[doing A is forbidden in C]]  =def.. {hD:  for every , -mindedly chooses not to A 
in C on hD}  
 
doing A is permitted in C  universally rejecting rejecting doing A in C 
[[A is permitted in C]] =def.. {hD:  for every , either single-mindedly chooses to A in 
C or indifferently chooses whether or not to A in C on hD}  
 
The usual dualities among the modal operators, and the equivalences among obligation, 
permission, and forbiddance and their negations (e.g., doing A is obliged in C just in case not 
doing A is forbidden in C) are established by the fact that negation is treated as a complement 
operator.  Using the language of commitment, entitlement and incompatibility, the content-
determining linguistic normative statuses of a natural language are enforced via the 
corresponding normative attitudes.  That is, hinking 
terms of regarding commitment - , where this 
                                                          
6 These definitions concern the moral deontic modalities, which apply to everyone.  More restricted forms of 
deontic sentence involve either quantifiying over different agents in the specifications of the corresponding 
hyperplans, or building that restriction into the specification of the circumstance C. 
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mental state is that of plan, were one any member of the linguistic community, to single-
mindedly choose not to utter not- 7   
The distinction between the single-minded and the indifferent frame of mind is needed 
to model the difference between the strong and weak deontic f rces.  But owing to the fact 
the 
intentional state of mind, whether individual or shared, can be modelled simply in terms of 
choices for and against various options (see Stovall Forthcoming A for details; Bratman, e.g. 
2014, and Ludwig 2016 likewise think of shared intentionality in terms of planning).  Let an 
intentional hyperplan hI be a maximally consistent plan of action such that, for every 
circumstance C C, and every action A
choose to perform at C, either (exclusively):  
 
1) A in C on hI; or 
2) A in C on hI 
 
Where 
A in C plans where 
everyone who is one of the group determined by the indexical chooses t  A together with the 
group in C on the corresponding intentional hyperplans (the inclusion of the condition that 
they choose to A together rules out certain kinds of cases commonly discussed in the 
literature on shared intentionality; see Stovall Forthcoming B):  
 
[[  shall A in C]] =def.. {hI:   to A together in C on hI}  
 
On this semantics both the deontic and the intentional frame of mind are species of a genus of 
one would do were one other members of a shared community.  I  part VII I will survey 
empirical research that suggests this philosophical picture of practical rationality is tracking 
physiological facts about the exercise of practical rationality in human beings.  But the fact 
that the semantics for sentences whose assertions give expression tointentional mental states 
does not require distinguishing the single-minded from the indifferent attitude suggests that 
the intentional frame of mind, whether individual or shared, is a less conceptually 
sophisticated form of mental life than is the deontic frame of mind.  This provides a clue, to 
be developed below, as to the ground of iscursive cognition in the natural world. 
 
                                                          
7 The specification in terms of choosing not to utter not-
are committed to it is enough to not say something we are committed to the negation of. 
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III.  -Use Diagrams 
That a semantics of this form can be provided is noteworthy, particularly as it develops and 
 about moral reasoning and shared intentionality (see the 
discussion in Stovall Forthcoming A).  But its significance goes beyond the formalism, for as 
a theory of practical rationality it makes bold and interesting claims about the nature of 
practical reasoning as a foundation for theoretical reasoning.  It does so by supplying the raw 
materials for framing an understanding of how discursive cognition of the sort made possible 
with a natural language can be built upon the basis of our natural capacity for shared 
intentionality.  To see this, I propose to use a line of thinking in  Between Saying 
and Doing (2008) as a guide.  At the core of that book is a gr phical method for representing 
necessity and sufficiency relations between practices and the vocabularies those practices 
either presuppose or supply a foundation for.  He calls these meaning-use diagrams.  
Brandom begins by examining relations of meaning and use among vocabularies sufficient to 
specify practices or abilities (VP-sufficiency relations), practices or abilities sufficient to 
deploy vocabularies (PV-sufficiency relations), and vocabularies sufficient for characterizing 
other vocabularies by specifying the practices or abilities sufficient to deploy them (VV-
sufficiency relations).  When a given vocabulary is VP-sufficient for specifying practices that 
are PV-sufficient for deploying another vocabulary, the VV-sufficiency relation that results is 
said to be a pragmatically mediated semantic relation between the two vocabularies.  To get 
a grip on what Brandom means here, and to clear the way to an extension of this mode of 
reasoning in the direction of an evolutionary understanding of human rationality, I will  look 
at two of the meaning-use diagrams he discusses. 






             VV-suff.        
            PV-suff. 
 
 
         VP-suff. 
          
 
The horizontal line on this diagram depicts that a vocabulary of norms is sufficient for 
specifying the practice of alethic modal reasoning:  talk of what one is obliged and permitted 






possible (a vocabulary-practice or VP-sufficiency relation).  The vertical line depicts that the 
practice of modal reasoning is in turn sufficient for deploying a vocabulary of modality (a 
PV-sufficiency relation).  For one who has learned what he or she is obliged and permitted to 
assent to can then (in principle) talk of what is necessary and possible.  As a consequence, the 
diagonal line depicts that  normative vocabulary is sufficient for characterizing an alethic 
modal vocabulary (a VV-sufficiency relation) in virtue of specifying practices that are 
themselves sufficient for deploying that modal vocabulary there is a pragmatically mediated 
semantic relation between normative and alethic modal vocabulary, whereby the language of 
norms functions as a metalinguistic analogue to object-language alethic modal vocabulary.  
The language of modality, then, is a tr nsposed language of norms insofar as practices 
involving the object-language use of alethic modal vocabulary can be specified in terms of 
give expression to the claim that one is committed or entitled to the assertion of  
meaning-use diagrams I will look at here is an extension of 
the first, and it introduces two new meaning-use relations:  practices necessary for deploying 
vocabularies (PV-necessity relations), and practices sufficient for engaging in other practices 
(PP-sufficiency relations).  The first relation obtains when the use of some vocabulary 
presupposes the use of another.  For instance, the practice of normatively evaluating the 
actions of agents is PV-necessary for using moral vocabulary:  one cannot be in the business 
of talking about what is morally right and wrong except insofar as one evaluates (perhaps 
merely possible) agentive behavior.  PP-sufficiency relations obtain when the ability to 
engage in one sort of activity is sufficient for engaging in a different one. This notion 
develops out of automata theory and the search for procedures implemented in one kind of 
computational system that are sufficient to implement a different kind of procedure.  To take 
one of the examples Brandom uses (2008, pp.26-7), there are algorithms that employ 
subtraction and multiplication and which suffice for computing long division.  As a 
consequence, the practice of subtracting and multiplying according to a particular algorithm 
is PP-sufficient for a practice of long division.  In this regard it is possible for anything 
capable of responding to numbers by subtracting and multiplying them to substitute that 
response, via the algorithm, for one of division.  This is a process of algorithmic elaboration, 
where the ability to engage in one kind of activity is appropriated for use in engaging in a 
different kind of activity according to a set of instructions.  More generally, response 
substitution is a process whereby the ability to respond to some stimulus (e.g. the presence of 
two numbers) with a particular response (multiplying or subtracting them) is substituted for a 
different response (the procedure of multiplication and subtraction that implements 
division for more on these notions of algorithmic elaboration and response substitution see 
Brandom 2008 pp.26-7 and 36-8).8   
                                                          
8 er, including his interest in autonomous discursive 
practices (understood as languages games that are self-sufficient in the sense that one could play them without 
needing to play any other language game; cf. 2008 p.41), and his discussion of LX relations, whereby a 
vocabulary is elaborated from and explicative of some practice (as conditionals can be elaborated from and give 
object-language expression to the drawing of inferences; cf.2008 pp.47-8). 
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With this background in place, I will work incrementally through the line of reasoning 
the second diagram displays (Figure 2), though it has been developed extensively by Sellars 
(e.g. 1953 and 1958) and Brandom (2008).  At its core is the Kantian thought that the use of 
alethic modal notions is a condition on the possibility of making any judgment about the 
empirical world -
consists of two claims (2008, p.102, emphasis in the original):  
1. In using ordinary empirical vocabulary, one already knows how to do everything one 
needs to know how to do in order to introduce and deploy [alethic] modal vocabulary. 
2. The expressive role characteristic of alethic modal vocabulary is to make explicit 
semantic, conceptual connections and commitments that are already implicit in the use 
of ordinary empirical vocabulary. 
Here is the idea.  Grasp of ordinary empirical descriptive (OED) vocabulary requires being 
able to specify at least something about what that vocabulary entails and rules out at various 
contexts of use.  To understand what is said with an assertion of 
table (to understand how the use of this sentence describes the world)I need to know things 
about water and tables, such as that if the cup is tipped over the water would spill out, and 
that this would occur in a variety of contexts.  There may be no minimally necessary 
conditions that anyone must grasp to understand that sentence, but if I can draw no such 
counterfactually robust inferences about the cup of water and the table then I cannot be said 
And because I understand the 
material inferential relations within which t at sentence is situated in English, being told that 
sentence also tells me that the spilling of water onto the floor is a pregnant possibility at this 
context, and so I will be cognitively and affectively responsive to the range of conditions that 
would realize that possibility.  To put the point in Kantian terms, grasp of these material 
inferential relations, expressed through with the object-language use of 
subjunctive conditionals, is a condition on the possibility of understanding OED vocabulary.  
This line of thought was given systematic exposition by Sellars, particularly in 
  
From §108 of the latter: 
It is only because the expressions in terms of which we describe objects, even such basic 
expressions as words for the perceptible characteristics of molar objects locate these 
objects in a space of implications, that they describe at all, rather than merely label. 
It follows that the capacity to understand whatever we understand about the world (as 
reported with OED sentences) is a capacity that presupposes our ability to make 
counterfactually-robust inferences about the world (as reported with conditionals that do not 
entail their antecedent strengthenings).  Thus, the practice of counterfactual reasoning is PV 
necessary for the use of OED vocabulary 
linguistic meaning):  any practice that counts as using OED vocabulary is a practice that must 









       PV-nec. 





Similarly, the practice of discriminating ranges of counterfactual robustness is PP sufficient 
for practices involving the use of modal vocabulary.  This is because the ability to respond to 
the world by uttering various counterfactuals can be substituted with responses that use 
modal vocabulary anytime one is disposed to infer the consequent of a counterfactual 
under the supposition of any antecedent, this disposition can be replaced with a disposition to 
utter  ; and anytime one is disposed to infer the consequent under the 
supposition of some antecedent this response can be substituted for the disposition to utter  
is possible.  This fact about the relationship between the practice of using counterfactual 
conditionals and the practice of using modal vocabulary is reflected in the following 
p  
conditional; I defend these identities in chapter 3 of Stovall 2015):   
def. ( p)(p  
def. ( p)(p  
When I recognize that there are various things that could happen while the cup would still be 
on the table, but that no matter what if the cup were destroyed it would not be on the table, 
then one can substitute this quantification over the antecedents of subjunctive conditionals 
.  Correlatively, seeing that a cup of water is 
on the table, and knowing that if the cup were tipped over the rug would get wet, underwrites 
a response using the alethic modal:  the rug could get wet.  And so the practice of drawing 
counterfactual inferences is PP sufficient for engaging in practices that are themselves PV 














              PV-suff. 
 
 
       
         PP-suff. 
 
This in turn shows that the use of modal vocabulary is VP sufficient for specifying a practice 
of counterfactual reasoning (see Figure 4)
associated with reasoning to the conclusion  no matter what auxilliary facts obtain (and 






         VP-suff. 
              PV-suff. 
 
 
       
         PP-suff. 
 
Finally, because modal vocabulary is sufficient to specify practices of counterfactual 
reasoning that are necessary for OED vocabulary, there is a resulting pragmatically mediated 
VV-sufficiency relation between modal and empirical vocabulary.  Uniting Figure 1 with 
Pc-f inf. Pmodal 
Vmodal 




Figure 4, and including this last VV-sufficiency relation, Brandom presents this meaning-use 
diagram with Figure 5: 
Figure 5: 
  
         VV-suff. 
 
 
  VV-suff.     VP-suff.               
               PV-suff.           PV-nec. 
 
 
     




IV.  Normative Attitudes, Imperatives, and Purposive Practices 
Meaning-use diagrams are best seen as a heuristic, and all the work is done in arguing that the 
various PP, PV, VP, and VV relations hold.  Nevertheless, they are a useful heuristic.  For if 
we reorder the last diagram we have an apparent teleology or 
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This encourages us to ask what is lower in the hierarchy.  For normative or deontic 
vocabulary is not primitive in the species.  So what practices ar  ufficient for using that 
vocabulary?  Brandom suggests at one point (2008, p.111) that there is a normative practice 
that underlies the use of normative vocabulary presumably this practice is one of deploying 
the normative attitudes that are made such heavy use of in Making it Explicit, a practice of 

























We can now ask:  what kind of vocabulary would be sufficient for specifying a practice of 
adopting normative attitudes, and how might that vocabulary in turn be grounded in more 
primitive practices?   
Imperatives are a vocabulary sufficient to specify normative practices, whether 
concerning what one ought and may say or more generally about what one ought and may do.  
For by commanding that something be done (in the right context) one can impel an auditor to 
conform to a norm concerning what is obliged, and by commanding that something not be 
done one can impel an auditor to conform to a norm concerning what is forbidden.  And on 
the principle that what is not forbidden is permitted, norms concerning what is permitted are 
enforced in virtue of the absence of a command not to perform the activity.  The use of 
imperatives may be haphazard and unsystematic, of course, and at any rate mechanisms for 
enforcing a command (and punishing violators) may need to be in place.  But by (more-or-
less) systematically commanding that some types of action are to be done and not to be done, 
with other actions eliciting neither sort of command, it is possible to use a language of 
imperatives to specify practices that count as correct and incorrect within a community.  And 
so a systematic use of imperatives suffices to set up institutions within acommunity 
delineating obliged, forbidden, and permitted behavior, including linguistic institutions like 
the use of normative langauge.  This is to say that avocabulary of imperatives is VP 
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Because the use of normative vocabulary is mediated by the normative practices specified by 
a vocabulary of imperatives, there is a resulting VV-sufficiency relation between imperatival 
and normative vocabulary.  
(merely) ere 
neither the command to do something nor the command not to do it is issued.  And so there is 
a pragmatically mediated semantic relation between imperatival vocabulary and normative 
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Up to this point I have been treating these practices and vocabularies as situated 








been the ones which govern the use of language.  This is the way Brandom conceives of these 
vocabulary and practice relations, and while he gestures toward stickbeating as a predecessor 
to the explicit expression of normative attitudes in the use of normative vocabulary, he does 
not discuss that non-verbal behavior in any detail.  My interest here, on the other hand, lies in 
tracing pre- and proto-linguistic practices and vocal capacities that can help us understand 
how we got here from there.   
We are now wading into philosophical anthropology and the just-so stories that result.  
While having a limited explanatory value, these efforts can be useful in helping us think 
about the large-scale features of our evolutionary past.9  The best instances are well-
integrated with existing bodies of research, help to draw that research into a more coherent 
overall picture of the world, and offer predictions that can be empirically tested.  As I proceed 
I will indicate places where this proposal appears consonant with relevant empirical research, 
and in part VII  I will argue that empirical research into the ontogeny and physiology of 
intentionality and normative psychology, and imperatival behavior in human and non-human 
primates, is predicted by and so supports this analysis.  P ychological nominalism gives us a 
method for proceeding.  Using the conceptual resources of language use as a guide, we 
construct an analogical understanding of pre- and protolinguistic hominid behavior by 
looking for vocal practices that, while not yet verbal, play much the same role in 
understanding our ancestors grunts and groans as their properly verbal analgues play in 
our understanding of the discursive rationality characterized by self-conscious use of a 
natural language.  Throughout the effort to construct this analogical understanding, we must 
consider ways in which more primitive sorts of practices and (proto-) vocabularies could, by 
response substitution and algorithmic elaboration, be replaced with their conceptually 
sophisticated linguistic analogues.  While full-fledged linguistic categories like imperative 
and modality may be useful guides in searching for the more rudimentary cognition and 
behavior that underlie our ability to employ these categories, it is important to remember that 
pre- or proto-linguistic habits are pre- or proto-linguistic, and we may not yet have adequate 
conceptual resources to understand how these habits operate.  But if successful this will result 
in a picture of the transition from non-li guistic communal hominid behavior to linguistic 
rationality that is grounded in our best scientific understandings of ourselves, and which 
offers the prospect of further empirical(and philosophical development.   
Toward that end, it is noteworthy that the disposition to positively and negatively 
sanction some behavior, if spread within a community, can set up de facto norms about that 
behavior: 
acting on the intention to stickbeat doing A in C and flocktend not doing A in C is one way 
of training people to conform to the norm that A is forbidden in C 
acting on the intention to stickbeat not doing A in C and flocktend doing A in C is one way 
of training people to conform to the norm that A is obliged in C 
                                                          
9 The classical critique of this sort of explanation, directed at sociobiology, is Gould and Lewontin (1979).  For 
a reply see Lennox (1991). 
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acting on the intention to not stickbeat doing A in C and not flocktend not doing A in C is 
one way of training people to conform to the norm that A is permitted in C10 
The intentions lying behind these norm-enforcing sanctioning dispositions may not be 
cognitively sophisticated nonhuman primate sanctioning behavior may be intentionally 
directed toward hierarchical access to food without the ones engaging in that behavior 
having, in any meaningful sense, a thought the alpha male 
gets to eat first In this regard the notion of intentionality is not the discursive sort that 
interests Brandom in the last chapter of (2008), and which he conceives in terms of the grasp 
of a natural language, but rather the practical intentionality he associates with behavior that is 
-3; 
at p.190 he refers t Something like this 
latter notion of intentionality occurs in the literature on human and animal cognition as well, 
including in cases where young humans do not yet have grasp of a natural language or a 
theory of mind.  Tollefsen (2005), for instance, argues that young children can engage in joint 
intentional behavior prior to the development of a a robust theory of mind, and Tomasello 
(1995) defends the following proposal (p.105): 
[B]y the end of their second year of life: 
1. Children understand other persons in terms of their intentions. 
2. Children understand that others have intentions that may differ from their own. 
3. Children understand that others have intentions that may not match with the 
current state of affairs (accidents and unfulfilled intentions). 
which human beings guide their behavior, not to the philosophical sense of intentionality 
including all mental  
In subsequent work Tomasello and his colleagues have spelled out this notion of 
intentionality in terms of the ability to frame (and share) plans of action (e.g. Tomasello et al. 
2005).  In humans this ability emerges in infancy and appears to develop on the basis of 
simpler forms of action interpretation:  by 6 months of age infants can anticipate what 
humans will do in familiar circumstances, and they begin to engage with others in dyadic 
relations where they share emotions; by 9 months they recognize agential behavior as goal-
directed and persistent in the face of obstacles, and they engage triadically with others in 
attending to objects in the environment; and by 14 months they begin to understand that 
people form plans to achieve their goals, and they engage with others collaboratively in 
pursuing shared goals (see Tomasello et al. 2005, p. 689).  The semantics provided in part II  
supplies a framework for thinking about the pre- and proto-linguistic practically intentional 
mental states that precede, in the genealogy of the species and the ontogeny of individuals, 
the discursive intentionality that comes with full -fledged participation in a linguistic 
                                                          
10 This might be put in terms of simply not having the intention either to stickbeat doing A in C or to flocktend 
not doing A in C. 
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community.  For on that semantics the contents of intentional mental states are modelled by 
plans that are not specified in terms of the distinction between the single-minded and the 
indifferent attitude, which is necessary for distinguishing the strong and weak deontic 
modalities.  In part V I will argue that practical intentions, individual and shared, can indeed 
be seen as the basis for the practices that will become the explicit adoption of norms. 
For the purpose of marking the evolutionary transition from non-verbal positive and 
negative sanctioning (flocktending and stickbeating) to the self-conscious obedience to norms 
that accompanies use of a natural language, it is instructive to consider the shared-intentional 
conditions for discursive cognition as situated in the framework of evolutionary naturalism.  
As organisms flourishing within a particular ecological niche, human beings are purposefully 
directed toward our environment in various ways, and success in human life requires the 
shared pursuit of common purposeshunting, finding shelter, tool manufacturing and use, 
etc.  It is no arbitrary fact about us that prehistoric cave paintings share common themes, and 
Tomasello et al. (2012) argue that a period in hominid evolution required collaborative 
foraging (stag-hunt scenarios) for survival which in turn selected for the capacity to engage in 
shared action directed at common purposes.  Activity directed at common goals may be 
shaped by non-vocal positive and negative reinforcement (stickbeating and flocktending), but 
in many contexts vocal and visual cues will be better fitted to achieving a shared end (think 
of two hunters directing  movements while sneaking toward a prey).   
Consider a hypothetical ancestral community whose members began to communicate 
with one another through patterns of v cal behavior.  If grasp of the counterfactual conditions 
ondition on thinking about those objects 
in the determinate ways they exist (the Kant-Sellars thesis), then grasp of the counterfactual 
conditions that govern the purposive behavior of organic activity (ours and that of other 
species) will be an important part of what lets us survive.  It is only by knowing what we do 
about the subjunctive stabilities toward which organic generation and growth tend that we 
can intelligently plant a garden and reap its harvestto say nothing of our ability to reason 
about the subjunctive space within which the wolf as against the antelope is situated (I 
maintain that there is a clear pattern to these organism-enabled subjunctively-stable relations; 
cf. chapter 6 of Stovall 2015).  Of the purposive activities the grasp of which is essential for 
Knowing the 
subjunctive stabilities that govern our individual and shared agency affords us an increased 
measure of understanding and control over one of the most important elements of our 
evolutionary environment:  the communities within which we live and move and have our 
being (cf. chapter 7 of Stovall 2015).  This puts evolutionary pressure toward developing the 
capacity to anticipate the subjunctively-stable ends toward which human behavior is 
habitually directed that is, it puts pressure on the species toward our developing the ability 
to read the intentions of the members of our community. 
Suppose the members of a lineage within this community of hypothetical ancestors 
were more adept at recognizing and anticipating the purposive activities of their fellows, by 
being able to more accurately track the subjunctive spaces of those activities.  With a nod 
toward Sellars (1956) .  The capacity to 
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track counterfactual relations among states of affairs in the world with regard to the pursuit of 
one can more effectively 
when one has a better sense of what they are up to.  With the ability to better anticipate the 
purposively directed activities of other humans, the Joneses can more effectively stickbeat 
and flocktend their fellows so as to achieve their ownpurposes.  And just as the individual in 
the community capable of engaging in such activities of tracking and shaping the purposive 
tendencies of his or her conspecifics would gain a social (and so reproductive) advantage 
over his or her peers, so would a lineage of these Joneses spread throughout a community.  
An evolutionary game of keeping up with the Joneses would have begun. 
In the context of meaning-use analysis this line of reasoning licenses the conclusion 
that the purposive practices of human beings, having developed evolutionarily toward the 
capacity to track and shape the practices of others in the community, are PV sufficient for the 
use of imperatival vocabulary (see Figure 10).  This is because our shaping the behaviors of 
others in the community is motivated by the ends that we individually and collectively share 
as the kinds of organisms we areit is because of their need to hunt with spears, for instance, 
that our ancestors trained their young to fashion spears in a particular way.  Equipped as we 
are with various purposively directed dispositional acts, thoughts, and feelingswritten into 
the skein of the central nervous system, as it wereth  use of imperatives sees to it that our 
individual and shared purposes are more effectively achieved.  For we substitute the 
stickbeating and flocktending practices of bodily positive and negative reinforcement for 
(what will become) the verbal practice of uttering commands:  anytime one is disposed to 
stickbeat doing A in C A in C
an agent doing A in C.11  And in doing so we exercise our agency more effectively, 










                                                          
11 Wittgensteinean worries about what exactly is commanded might arise here.  In principle these worries are 
philosophically interesting, but in fact we are animals that share a form of life and so when, e.g., two hunters are 
stalking a prey across the savannah there is often very little left to doubt when a command of some sort is 






We need not suppose that what will become explicit imperatives are conceived as 
such at the start, however, and the vocal abilities that become properly verbal may have been 
at work long before any hominid ever uttered anything like a word (things much like 
sentences may need to be in play much earlier).  But just as a representational state can be of 
a field of flowers without being as a field of flowers in the cognitive economy of the thing in 
that state (cf. honey bees), so can obedience to an imperative have the practical consequence 
of sharing purposes even if the creatures responding to the command re not aware of the 
purpose for which the command is given.  Positive and negative reinforcement schedules 
allow us to shape all sorts of dispositions among ther animals without their being aware of 
the purposes we have in doing so; the same is true of s.
The practice of using normative vocabulary is in turn PP sufficient for a purposive 
practice, as can be seen by the fact that the responses of the former sort of practice (responses 
of using normative vocabulary) can be substituted with responses of the latter sort of practice 
(using imperatives, and the acts of stickbeating and flocktending these imperatives give voice 
to).  For one who is using a language of norms is already doing enough to be able to engage 
in the purposive practice of shaping the , and 
the language of normative modality gives a community the ability to specify that which 
stickbeating and flocktending are directed toward must A in C .  A language of 
imperatives mediates this transition from brute disposition to the discursive understanding of 
, the 
behaviors including linguistic behaviors of the members of that community.12  Taking 











                                                          
12 Of course, for the imperative to be an imperative there must be some institution or threat of sanctioning in 
force.  But in societies with internal sanctioning the mere fact that one is collectively recognized as having 
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Finally, notice that any practice sufficient for introducing modal vocabulary is PP ufficient, 
via response substitution, for engaging in practices sufficient to introduce normative 
vocabulary.  For one who uses modal vocabulary can be taught to substitute that use with t e 
corresponding normative vocabulary, b  teaching them to go metalinguistic:  the object-
rubber is replaced with the 
rubber 13  





                                                          
13 A that-clause and proposition might be used as well rubber conducts e  This 
introduces questions about the status of propositions in the object language, 
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Call this s Ladder  descended from 
heaven to earth, s ladder is one on which human beings have ascended from nature to 
spirit through the development and propogation of a natural language and its associated 
norms.  If this line of argument is sound, then we now have an answer as to how the practice 
of adopting normative attitudes, in the way that underlies use of a natural langauge, comes to 
be instituted:  via the purposive practices that give rise to the imperatives that shape the 
proto-linguistic vocal behaviors of the members of the community.  
Still, we face a question of how to mark the ransition from brute sanctioning 
dispositions to participation in the game of giving and asking for reasons.  I do not think we 
are in a position to answer that in the detail I am suggesting we need, though I hope to be 
indicating promising lines of further investigation.  Toward that end I want to draw attention 
to a linguistic device that allows us to issue imperatives whose use clearly signals discursive 
cognition.  It is a feature of the two-
operators (should, ought, must, etc.), that it permits a (limited) embedding of imperatives 
while remaining in the imperatival mode can take two declaratives and 











the baby does not catch a 
the baby does not catch Use of what I call these teleological imperatives gives 
voice to our capacity to intelligently guide the behavior of other members of our linguistic 
community by giving them reasons for what we tell them to do, and this lets us collectivize 
our intellectual resources ( ee the discussion in chapter 7 of Stovall 2015).  
reason for which that imperative is issued, and in doing so it guides the auditor to shut the 
y be something the auditor will know to do even if the 
speaker is unaware that the window is open.  Teleological imperatives thereby enable a 
community to engage in reason-based shared action more effectively.  Whatever else the 
transition from brute sanctioning to the lingustic use of imperatives involves, the presence of 
teleological imperatives marks a community whose members are reason-mongerers.  
 
V. Practical Rationality as the Ground of Theoretical Rationality 
Carrying the examination further we must ak:  what are the purposive practices that underlie 
the initial employment of stickbeating and flocktending followed by the use of imperatives?  I 
propose we understand them as shared intentions to positively and negatively sanction 
coordinates this kind of shared 
agency by directing people toward the means necessary to achieve our goals.  
In part IV I argued that a vocabulary of imperatives isufficient to characterize a 
practice of adopting normative attitudes, which practice is in turn sufficient for deploying a 
normative vocabulary.  This is to say that there is a pragmatically mediated semantic relation 
between imperatival and normative vocabulary.  I also argued that the purposive practices of 
human beings are PV sufficient, in the context of our evolutionary genealogy and social 
upbringing, for the use of imperatives.  These purposive practices may take the form of 
stickbeating and flocktending, and plans to stickbeat and flocktend are just the sort of thing 
that the intentional fragment of the semantics from part II  is meant to model.  These plans 
may have rough analogues in central nervous system dispositions (m re on this in part VII), 
but here I focus on their features as they figure in that semantics.  For it falls out of that 
semantics, as a consequence of the need to discriminate two choice attitudes in order to 
model the strong and weak forces for the deontic modality, that the deontic frame of mind 
requires more cognitive sophistication than does the intentional one, whether individual or 
shared.  One can exercise deontic practical rationality only insofar as one can discriminate the 
single-minded from the indifferent choice, and this capacity differs from merely choosing to 
do something insofar as it requires that one also bear attitudes toward actions no  u dertaken.  
When choosing to A single-mindedly one rejects every action that is incompatible with A, 
and the indifferent frame of mind also requires that the actor be attitudinally related to actions 
not undertaken.  For on the definition given in part II one chooses to A indifferently just in 
case there is another option incompatible with A which one could have undertaken, and 
-minded choices.  The merely 
intentional choice to do A, on the other hand, can be made without any regard to 
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incompatible alternatives.14  Shared plans to stickbeat and flocktend in ways that institute 
normative statues in a community thereby suffice to make it the case that there are things that 
ought and may be done long before anyone ever need to have known or thought about their 
normative statuses.  Thus the intentional frame of mind, even the shared intentional one, can 
be understood as a basis for instituting the conditions within which the deontic one can be 
exercised. 
In part II I used a planning semantics for the deontic modalities to characterize the 
normative attitudes that enforce the meaning-determining normative statuses of a linguistic 
-mindedly choose not to say not-
 self-consciously regard sentences as standing 
in normative relations thereby presupposes the practical capacity to choose single-m d dly, 
which is more cognitively sophisticated than the capacity simply to choose insofar as in the 
former case one must reject all choices incompatible with that single-minded decision.  
Nevertheless, the normative statuses of pre- and proto-linguistic communicative vocal 
behaviors can be instituted by shared intentions toward positive and negative reinforcement 
without presupposing that those behaviors count as properly linguistic.  But one is aware of 
norms as norms of thought and action only once the ability to make the single-minded choice 
emerges in a community that has instituted such statuses.  Only in that case is language on the 
scene, and this requires the capacity to planfrom a single-minded point of view. 
Another feature of practical rationality exhibited by the semantics of part II reinforces 
this conclusion about the cognitive sophistication that comes with the deontic as against the 
merely intentional frame of mind.  For the ability to distinguish the single-minded and the 
indifferent choice also underwrites a capacity to mark off practical species or determinations 
from their practical genera or determinables.  When I have decided single-mind dly to dress 
professionally, while choosing indifferently between two suits which while incompatible with 
each other are both compatible with that single-minded decision, I have classified each of the 
acts of dressing in one of those suits as an act that satisfies the more general act of dressing 
professionally.  And one is able to act on a judgment about what one ought to do only insofar 
as one can determine what counts as satisfying that injunction.  Owing to the determinacy of 
the world, and the various ways a judgment about what ought to be done can be satisfied, this 
requires being able to sort instances of a general action type according to its specifications.  It 
follows that the ability to discriminate indifferent from single-minded choices is the ability to 
discriminate the practical species or determinations of a practical genus or determinable.  
Because this practical capacity underlies the ability to make a deontic judgment about what 
one ought or may do, while this latter ability affords us the self-consciousness that comes 
with the grasp of a natural language, this is to say that our theoretically rational capacity to 
think in a discursive frame of mind is conditioned by our practically rational capacity to 
                                                          
14 Hegel thinks that this difference demarcates the merely desirous animal kingdom from the spiritual lives of 
human beings.  In the presence of food non-spiritual animals will  
p.65 see the discussion in Brandom 2019 p.240-3).  We creatures of spirit, however, are able to imbue food 
and drink with a ceremonial significance that involves treating that sustenance differentlyit may become the 
body and blood of a divinity whose presence suffuses a community that collectively observes these ceremonies.  
To treat food in this way is to regard ingesting it single-mindedly in a way that non-discursive cognition cannot. 
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mark genus/species or determinable/determination relations in agency.  A d so I propose that 
the practical rationality accompanying the deontic plan is what fundamentally distinguishes 
us from the brutes, and that our capacity for theoretical rationality and discursive cognition of 
the sort that accompanies use of a natural language is derivative from it. 
s Ladder is one on which humans ascended from nature to 
spirit.  We are now in a position todeepen our understanding of that idea.  For the distinction 
between the kinds of plans needed to account for sha ed intentions, and the kinds of plans 
needed to account for deontic cognition, makes sense of the difference between the non-
discursive cognition and the subtle and polydimensional discourse of the drawing room, the 
laboratory, and the study that Sellars refers to at the end of Empiricism and the Philosophy 
of Mind.  This subtle and polydimensional discourse is one that is fraught with ought , 
which is to say it is one that requires us to distinguish what we ought to do from what we may 
and may not.  On the semantics given above, this means that such discourse requires we be 
able to distinguish determination/determinable or species/genus r lations in practical 
rationality, and it is this practical capacity that grounds our ability to exercise theoretical 
rationality in the propositionally contentful ways we do.  
At this stage of the argument the picture is the following:  linguistic meaning, and the 
discursive cognition exemplified by the grasp of a natural language, is at least partially 
explained by inferential role; inferential roles are at least partially explained by normative 
statuses; normative statuses are at least partially explained by normative attitudes; normative 
attitudes are at least partially explained by purposive practices, and purposive practices are at 
least partially explained by shared intentions.  In part VII I will complete this picture, if only 
in outline, by looking at the natural basis of shared intentionality.  First I address an objection 
that this account presupposes what it aims to explain, and by responding to it I hope to better 
illustrate the explanatory relations proposed here.   
 
VI.  An Objection  
One might worry that intentions presuppose the semantic content of discursive cognition that 
normative attitudes are supposed to underwrite.  A in C the 
kind of thing that one must be a language us r to be capable of?  That is not so, however, for 
according to psychological nominalism the exercise of discursive cognition is a function of 
in conformity to a rule but also the ability to frame a representation of a rule and act on a 
basis of a recognition of its propriety.  And being disposed to flocktend doing A in C may be 
a trait an organism has without having the slightest sense of that trait as one that ought to be 
possessed or acted on.  Using the language of Sellars (1954, 1969), developed more 
extensively in Stovall (2020), we can say that intentional action may be pattern-conforming 
without being a case of rule-following.  As rule-following action proceeds on the basis of a 
recognition of the propriety of a rule, it is deontic action and so presupposes an ability to 
choose single-mindedly and indifferently.  Nevertheless, we can be made to conform to 
patterns without recognizing them as rules and still less recognizing their propriety as 
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rules without being able to choose single-mindedly or indifferently.  For as we saw in part 
IV , the merely intentional choice ( ven the shared intentional one) is sufficient to set up 
positive and negative reinforcement schedul s that habituate the members of a community 
into conforming to norms without presupposing that the members of such a community have 
the capacity to choose either single-mindedly or indifferently.  Indeed, there is no 
presupposition that the ones nforcing these behaviors have that capacity.  And so these 
habituated norm-governed institutions including the institutions concerning vocal behavior 
that will become the rules of a natural languagemay be set up and propagated even if no 
individual within the community sees him- or herself as attempting to enforce a norm (cf. the 
discussion of collective action that is individually intentional under different descriptions for 
each actor but not collectively intentional under any description, as in poisoning the 
environment, in Ludwig 2016, chapter 11). 
Of course, on the account I am proposing, the ability to say that something is obliged, 
forbidden, or permitted
cognition presupposes an ability to discriminate single-mindedness from indifference.  And 
so Kantian autonomy, or the self-consciousness that comes with the exercise of judgment, 
requires the resources of deontic cognition that underlie language use.  Perhaps, as Sellars 
suggests, there is room to ascribe propositionally-contentful psychological attitudes to non-
cognition that accompanies language use without yet being able to reason in the sense of 
using logical vocabulary.  This would be to ascribe a kind of  in 
the world that is conscious without being self-conscious, conceived as a kind of shadow cast 
by the illumination that comes with rationalitya shadow that precedes the illuminated 
figure of humanity in the evolution of discursive cognition.  Either way, the ability to 
conform to the norms that govern what is obliged, forbidden, and permitted within a 
community (including the norms that govern a natural langua e) can be instituted simply on 
the basis of stickbeating and flocktending behaviors specifiable in terms of intentional 
choices that do not require single-mindedness or indifference.  And so because planning on 
choosing whether or not to do something were one a particular member of a community is a 
capacity that does not by itself presuppose a distinction between choosing indifferently and 
choosing single-mindedly, whereas the ability to distinguish these two kinds of choices is a 
condition on grasp of the rules that governs the exercise of discursive cognition, there is 
a clear sense in which shared intentions can be understood as a basis for the social practices 
that underlie the exercise of discursive cognition (as manifest in the grasp of a natur l 
language strong enough to contain its own metalanguage) without presupposing the exercise 
of discursive cognition these practices make possible.  This conception of a step from 
intentional to discursive cognition is supported by studies of human ontogeny, as there is 
good evidence that the ability to understand and share practical intentions emerges across all 
cultures at around 1 year of age, whereas an understanding of semantically contentful belief 
states develops in the following years and ppears to be mediated by the ability to 
communicate linguistically (see Tomasello and Rakoczy 2003). 
To return to our just-so story, while the Joneses are imagined to have an advantageous 
cognitive capacity to track purposive and causal relations, with a corresponding ability to 
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 early members of that lineage may not be aware of 
 advantageous, the ability to recognize that 
this is what people are doing will be advantageous as well, as it allows for a more effective 
discernment and shapingand so self-
speech and deed, will not be far behind the emergence of the Joneses.  Once begun, and so 
long as the Joneses are around, we play the game of keeping up with them.   
 
VII.  The Physiological Basis of Shared Intentionality in Human Beings 
I close with a brief survey of some of the empirical work that reinforces the view I have 
developed in this essay.  As I mentioned at the end of part I, some of this work is already 
being used by philosophers, and some of it draws on Sellarsian notions of rationality as a 
norm-governed and essentially social activity.  I believe more cross-pollination between 
philosophical and scientific investigations into this area will be to the benefit of everyone. 
In part IV I said that philosophical anthropology and its just-so stories sometimes 
have predictive value.  There are two sorts of predictions that my proposal makes:  one 
concerning what we should expect to see in the existing empirical literature if this proposal is 
sound, and another concerning novel predictions that can guide further empirical research.  
Beginning with the first, if the capacity to adopt deontic attitudes in human beings was 
conditioned by the capacity to exercise shared intentionality, then we should expect to see 
deontic cognition and shared intentionality emerge early in human ontogeny, with the latter 
preceding the former.  We would also expect to see similar, though less sophisticated, 
markers in non-human primates.  These expectations are borne out.  Human children engage 
in norm-governed shared intentional activity from an early age, and it appears that shared 
intentionality emerges ontogenetically prior to the emergence of norm-enforcing.  From 
Schmidt and Rakoczy (2018 p.698): 
From an ontogenetic point of view, basic forms of shared intentionality seem to develop 
from the second year of life:  from 12 to 18 months, children begin to engage in simple 
cooperative activities, both instrumental and playful, with others involving preverbal 
indicators of true shared intentionality such as coordination, communication, division of 
labor, and role reversal.  More complex forms of shared intentionality with conventional 
fact-creation emerge from the end of the second year, in particular, in the form of joint 
pretense and other games.  From this time on, children also show the first signs of actively
 
The proclivity to adopt normative attitudes in the context of shared activities is distinctive of 
human beings, and it emerges early in human ontogenetic development.  From Rakoczy and 
Schmidt (2013, p.20): 
Human social cognition early in development is characterized and set apart from that of 
other primates by incorporating the capacity to take the normative stance:  to jointly 
follow, respect, and to maintain social norms in a variety of domains. 
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From between 2 and 3 years of age human children are sensitive to normativity in the social 
sphere in rather complex ways:  they recognize the distinction between moral norms and 
norms of convention, and the fact that the latter depend on the agreement of community 
members (see Chudek and Henrich 2011, the opening pages of Göckeritz et al. 2014, 
Rakoczy and Schmidt 2013, and Schmidt and Rakoczy 2018); they distinguish norms from 
statistical regularity (Kalish 1998; Kalish and Cornelius 2007), and from around 3years of 
age they enforce norms on others (Rakoczy et al. 2008; Schmidt and Tomasello 2012).  3-
year-olds will also distinguish the strong from the weak deontic modality, by defending an 
that entitlement, and in some cases they recognize a second-order entitlement that an owner 
of an object has to entitle another person to use it (Schmidt, Rakoczy, and Tomasello 2013).  
By the age of 5 children engaged in joint activity with one another will create and enforce 
norms without adult guidance (Göckeritz et al. 2014).  Together this research suggests not 
only that the normative stance is integral to the distinctively human form of life, but that this 
stance develops on the basis of the s ared intentional nature of human sociality.  Indeed, the 
current essay can be read as an attempt to carry forward the proposal made in the last 
paragraph of the review essay by Schmidt and Rakoczy (2018, p.698; emphasis added): 
So, one picture that is worth being explored more systematically in future research is that 
while humans and other species, notably primates, share basic forms of individual 
intentionality (and the corresponding natural norms of correctness and success), uniquely 
human forms of norm psychology and uniquely human forms of shared intentionality 
develop in close tandem in early ontogeny, the former building on and growing out of the 
latter. 
Other features of human ontogeny predicted by my analysis also receive some 
empirical support, including the early emergence of dispositions to sanction different sorts of 
behavior, and that these dispositions predate the explicit use of normative language (Schmidt 
and Rakoczy 2018 and Rakoczy et al. 2008).  When presented with a puppet whose behavior 
violates the rules of a novel game, both 3-year-olds and 2-year-olds protest and criticize the 
puppet, though the former used more normative language than the latter (from Schmidt and 
Rakoczy 2018, p.690, summarizing research from Rakoczy et al. 2008).  There is also 
evidence that young children recognize the difference between imperatives and a sertions as 
having two directions of fit.  Rakoczy and Tomasello (2009) found that 3-year-olds protest a 
commentator who asserts that an actor was performing an action when this was not the case, 
but they protest the actor if she does not do something the commentator told her to do.  Lohse 
et al. (2014) found that 4-year-olds mark the different normative profiles of future-directed 
predictions and imperatives with the same content, such that a speaker makes a mistake if the 
prediction does not come true whereas an actor makes a mistake if the commanded action is 
not undertaken. 
The phylogenetic development of our ability to adopt the normative stance in the 
context of joint activity is harder to reconstruct, but there are some suggestive lines of 
research.  The capacity to engage in more-or-less rudimentary joint action is a feature of 
many higher animals, and the biological, evolutionary, and behavioral study of the associated 
mental states proceeds within a naturalist framework (for discussion of the naturalistic basis 
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of shared intentionality see Butterfill 2015, 
Tomasello 2014, Tomasello and Rakoczy 2003, and Warneken, Chen, and Tomasello 2006).  
Generally, communication among non-human primates is classified primarily in terms of 
imperatives, which indicates that this kind of communicative act does not require discursive 
rationality (for an overview see Tomasello 2019).  This makes the imperative a plausible 
basis for leveraging the evolved purposive capacities of our hominid ancestors into the 
implicitly norm-conforming capacities that predate the development of a natural language.  
And shared purposes likewise are a solid ground for the emergence of these proto-linguistic 
activities.  According to Tomasello and his collaborators, the evolutionary requirement for 
humans to communicate with one another in order to successfully cooperate in the pursuit of 
shared purposes drove both the development of more sophisticated capacities for shared 
intentionality, and the emergence of language as a more effective mode of communication 
(see Tomasello et al. 2012, and Tomasello and Gonzalez-Cabrera 2017).  I do not know of 
any research on teleological imperatives, but it might be illuminating to see where they 
emerge in human ontogeny, and to study how they are used in communication. 
Recent discoveries into the physiological basis of hared intentionality in human 
beings indicate that the mental states associated with shared intentions are facilitated by 
neural episodes that involve preparing to practical capacities as if one was 
performing the actions that others in the group perform.  Mimicry is a widespread feature of 
human interaction (for an overview see Chartrand and van Baaren 2009), and human subjects 
faced with joint tasks construct shared spaces of agency by representing action affordances 
from a common point of view (Davis et al 2010, Prinz 1997, Vesper et al 2010, Vesper et al 
2013).  When participating in joint action, parts of the brain associated with motor activity 
fire in an individual who is cooperating with someone else as if she herself were prepared to 
perform the action that her compatriot was performing (cf. Atmaca et al 2008, Butterfill 
2015, Loehr and Vesper 2016, Pezzulo et al 2013, and Wilson and Knoblich 2005).  This 
research provides an independent line of support for the planning semantics introduced in 
part II.  Summarizing his discussion of this literature Butterfill writes (2018, p.78, emphasis 
added): 
actions from your own.  Take motor simulation, task co-representation and motor 
representation of collective goals.  In each case, coordination involves motor or task 
re
action.  
a matter of preparing actions and representing tasks that she will perform in ways that 
would also be appropriate if it were you, not her, who was about to perform them.   
This empirical feature of the shared intentionality of human beings reinforces the decision to
model judgments that give expression to shared intentions in terms of plans concerning what 
the speaker would do were he or she other members of the community.   
Insight drawn from this scientific literature is already helping to frame our 
understanding of how the capacity for shared intentionality leverages us from nondiscursive 
to discursive cognition.  Butterfill (2015) argues that a philosophical appropriation of the 
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motor representations that underlie shared action can be used to model shared intentionality 
in a way that avoids the requirement for higher-order intentions that Bratman employs in his 
account of shared intentionality, on which participants in a shared action intend that the 
shared 
intentions interrelate in this way is explained by motor representations in the central nervous 
system rather than by appeal to intentions concerning intentions.  If these physiological states 
may count as we-intentional without requiring that their bearers frame explicitly we-
intentional thoughts, then we may be habitually or implicitly or un-self-consciously engaged 
in shared action without our doing so counting as agential or explicit or self-conscious.  This 
would mark an important transition point between pre-linguistic and linguistic cognition, 
insofar as such states are a precondition for the discursive exercises of shared intentionality 
that are made possible with participation in a linguistic community.  Additionally, Rizzolatti 
et al. (2002) distinguish low-level from high-level motor resonance, where the former 
movements 
shared intentionality institutes 
normative statuses in a community, it may be useful to likewise distinguish plans conceived 
in terms of movements from plans conceived in terms of actions.   
Finally, the semantics in part II also provides a novel prediction for further empirical 
investigation.  For if I am right that the deontic frame of mind differs from the shared 
intentional frame of mind insofar as the former requires distinguishing the single-minded 
attitudinally related to incompatible choices that are not undertakenthen this distinction 
should appear as a feature of neural activity:  the deontic psychological state should involve 
some representation of actions not undertaken in a way that the merely intentional state of 
mind does not.  Perhaps this could be tested between 2-year-olds and 3-year-olds, insofar as 
the latter use more normative language when protesting violations of rules in games 
(Rakoczy et al. 2008). 
At the end of part V I gave an incomplete picture of the place of mind in nature drawn 
over the course of this essay.  The fuller picture is the following:  linguistic meaning, and the
discursive cognition exemplified by the grasp of a natural language, is at least partially 
explained by inferential roles; inferential roles are at least partially explained by normative 
statuses; normative statuses are at least partially explained by normative attitudes; normative 
attitudes are at least partially explained by purposive practices, purposive practices are at 
least partially explained by shared intentions, and shared intentions are at least parti lly 
explained by the natural capacities we have as the kind of organism we are. 
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